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THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
RICHARD A. POSNER t
The use of the term "Chicago" to describe a body of antitrust
views to which I, among others, am thought to subscribe is very
common. I shall argue in this paper that although there was a time
when the "Chicago" school stood for a distinctive approach to anti-
trust policy, especially in regard to economic questions, and when
other schools, particularly a "Harvard" school, could be discerned
and contrasted with it, the distinctions between these schools have
greatly diminished. This has occurred largely as a result of the
maturing of economics as a social science, and, as a corollary
thereto, the waning of the sort of industrial organization that pro-
vided the intellectual foundations of the Harvard school. More
generally, this change can be attributed to the fact that the diversity
in fundamental premises among economists studying antitrust ques-
tions has substantially diminished. No longer is it such a simple
thing to identify a Harvard or a Chicago position on issues of anti-
trust policy. Partly this is a matter of growing consensus; partly of
a shift from disagreement over basic premises, methodology, and
ideology toward technical disagreements of the sort that would be
found even in a totally nonideological field.
Part I of this paper recounts the development of the Chicago
school of antitrust analysis, and, more briefly, of the Harvard school.
The sharpest differences between them are assignable to the 1950's
and early 1960's. Part II discusses a number of areas in which the
positions of the two school have since overlapped, converged, or
crossed over, with special reference to predatory pricing. Part III
considers the issue in which traces of the traditional Chicago-
Harvard confrontation are most conspicuous-the issue whether to
break up leading firms in highly concentrated industries. The
general conclusion of the paper is that it is no longer worth talking
about different schools of academic antitrust analysis.
I. THE CHICAGO AND HARVARD SCHOOLS: THE FOUNDATIONS
The basic features of the Chicago school of antitrust analysis
are attributable to the work of Aaron Director in the 1950's. Di-
f Lee and Brena Freeman Professor of Law, University of Chicago. The helpful
comments of Robert Bork, Kenneth Dam, William Landes, George Stigler, and
Donald Turner on a previous draft are gratefully acknowledged.
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rector formulated the key ideas of the school,' which were then
elaborated on by students and colleagues such as Bowman, Bork,
McGee, and Telser.2 These ideas did not, I believe, emerge from a
full-blown philosophy of antitrust. Rather, they were the product
of pondering specific questions raised by antitrust cases, and only
in retrospect did it become clear that they constituted the basis of a
general theory of the proper scope of antitrust policy. In summary
form the key ideas may be stated as follows:
1. A tie-in (i.e., requiring a buyer to buy a second product as
the condition of buying the first) is not a rational method of ob-
taining a second source of monopoly profits, because an increase in
the price charged for the tied product will, as a first approximation,
reduce the price that the purchaser is willing to pay for the tying
product. A tie-in makes sense only as a method of price discrimina-
tion, based on the fact that the amount of the tied product bought
can be used to separate purchasers into more or less elastic de-
manders of the tying product. There is no need to worry about
price discrimination, however, because it does not aggravate the
monopoly problem. On the contrary, price discrimination is a de-
vice by which the monopolist in effect seeks to serve additional
consumers, i.e., those having the more elastic demands, who might
be deterred by the single monopoly price that would be charged in
the absence of discrimination. Thus, price discrimination brings
the monopolist's output closer to that of a competitive market and
reduces the misallocative effects of monopoly.
2. From the standpoint of the manufacturer imposing it, resale
price maintenance is not a rational method of distribution if its
effect is to give dealers monopoly profits. Yet manufacturers, if
permitted, often will impose it. The explanation is that, by pre-
venting price competition among dealers, resale price maintenance
encourages dealers to offer consumers presale services (such as point
' Director formulated his ideas mainly orally. But see Director & Levi, Law and
the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 281 (1956).
2 See, e.g., Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History
of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 157 (1954); Bowman, Tying
Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE LJ. 19 (1957); McGee, Predatory
Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & EcoN. 137 (1958); Telser,
Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960). For
the most complete and most orthodox statement of the Chicago position see R. BoRK,
THE ANTITUST PARADOX (1978); for an anthology in which Chicago writings are
heavily represented see ThE COMP=ETITVE ECONOMY: SELECTED BEAUNns (Y.
Brozen ed. 1974). My own views, which closely resemble but are not identical to
the more orthodox Chicago position espoused by Bork, are expressed in R. PosNEn,
ANTT UST LAw (1976).
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of sale advertising, inventory, showroom display, and knowledge-
able sales personnel) up to the point at which the cost of these
services at the margin just equals the price fixed by the manufac-
turer. Such services, which enhance the value of the manufacturer's
product to consumers and hence the price he can charge the dealers,
might-because of "free-rider" 3 problems-not be provided if price
competition among dealers were permitted.
3. Selling below cost in order to drive out a competitor is un-
profitable even in the long run, except in the unlikely case in which
the intended victim lacks equal access to capital to finance a price
war. The predator loses money during the period of predation and,
if he tries to recoup it later by raising his price, new entrants will
be attracted, the price will be bid down to the competitive level,
and the attempt at recoupment will fail.4 Most alleged instances of
below-cost pricing must, therefore, be attributable to factors other
than a desire to eliminate competition.
These ideas generated others. The tie-in analysis, for instance,
was extended to vertical integration in general. To illustrate, it
makes no sense for a monopoly producer to take over distribution in
order to earn monopoly profits at the distribution as well as the
manufacturing level. The product and its distribution are com-
plements, and an increase in the price of distribution will reduce
the demand for the product.5 Assuming that the product and its
distribution are sold in fixed proportions, and thus that the price
discrimination analysis is inapplicable, the conclusion is reached
that vertical integration must be motivated by a desire for efficiency
rather than for monopoly.
The analysis of resale price maintenance generalized readily to
other restrictions on distribution, such as exclusive territories and
exclusive outlets. The predatory-pricing analysis generalized to
other methods by which firms were thought to hurt others by hurt-
ing themselves-for example, by demanding that purchasers sign
longer-term contracts than they desire, in order to deny a market to
competing sellers: a rational purchaser would demand compensa-
tion for accepting such a disadvantageous term.
3A "free rider" in this context would be a dealer who undersold competing
dealers by selling the product itself at a lower price while relying on them to provide
the necessary presale services to the customer.
4 Rather than suffer financial loss as a result of a price war, the rational
would-be monopolist would buy out the competing company.
5This is the same reason why manufacturers would not want their dealers to
cartelize distribution and why, therefore, Director sought an alternative explanation
for resale price maintenance.
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From these various analyses, a conclusion of great significance
for antitrust policy emerges: firms cannot in general obtain or en-
hance monopoly power by unilateral action 6-unless, of course, they
are irrationally willing to trade profits for position. Consequently,
the focus of the antitrust laws should not be on unilateral action;
it should instead be on: (1) cartels and (2) horizontal mergers large
enough either to create monopoly directly, as in the classic trust
cases,7 or to facilitate cartelization by drastically reducing the num-
ber of significant sellers in the market. Since unilateral action, as
I have defined the term, had been the cutting edge of antitrust
policy for a great many years, to place it beyond the reach of anti-
trust law, as Director and his followers seemed to want to do, im-
plied a breathtaking contraction in the scope of antitrust policy.
What was the source of Director's heterodox thinking? Be-
cause of Director's close personal and professional associations with
Milton Friedman, it is common to think that Director's antitrust
analysis was the product of conservative (which is to say, "liberal"
in the nineteenth-century sense of the term) antipathy to govern-
ment intervention in the economy. I question this view. I believe
Director's conclusions resulted simply from viewing antitrust policy
through the lens of price theory. Each of his ideas was deducible
from the assumption that businessmen are rational profit-maxi-
mizers, the deduction proceeding in accordance with the tenets of
simple price theory, i.e., that demand curves slope downward, that
an increase in the price of a product will reduce the demand for its
complement, that resources gravitate to the areas where they will
earn the highest return, etc. "Simple" and "easy" are not the same
thing, however. Although the analytic tools used by Director were
simple, the insights they yielded were extremely subtle. Certainly
they were resisted for many years.
Yet it is still fair to ask why the application of price theory to
antitrust should have been a novelty. The answer, I believe, is
that in the 1950's and early 1960's, industrial organization, the field
of economics that studies monopoly questions, tended to be un-
theoretical, descriptive, "institutional," and even metaphorical.8
6 By this I mean action that does not involve agreement with a competitor. It
may, of course, involve agreement with a customer or supplier, and generally does:
even a sale below cost involves at least an implicit contract between seller and
purchaser.
7 See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
8 Its flavor is well conveyed in the writings of Edward S. Mason. See, e.g.,
E. MASON, EcONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY ThOBLEM (1957). For
a representative application of 1950's-style industrial organization to antitrust prob-
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Casual observation of business behavior, colorful characterizations
(such as the term "barrier to entry"), eclectic forays into sociology
and psychology, descriptive statistics, and verification by plausibility
took the place of the careful definitions and parsimonious logical
structure of economic theory. The result was that industrial organi-
zation regularly advanced propositions that contradicted economic
theory.
An example is the "leverage" theory of tie-ins that Donald
Turner, a Harvard economist in the Edward Mason and Joe Bain
tradition, espoused shortly after Director had developed his price-
discrimination theory of tie-ins.9 The leverage theory held that if a
seller had a monopoly of one product, he could and would mo-
nopolize its indispensable complements as well, so as to get addi-
tional monopoly profits. Thus, if he had a patented mimeograph
machine, he would lease the machine at a monopoly price and also
require his lessees to buy the ink used in the machine from him and
charge them a monopoly price for the ink. This procedure, how-
ever, makes no sense as a matter of economic theory. The pur-
chaser is buying a service, mimeographing. The pricing of its
components is a mere detail; it is, rather, the total price of the serv-
ice that he cares about. If the seller raises the price of one com-
ponent, the ink, the purchaser will treat this as an increase in the
price of the service. If the machine is already being priced at the
optimal monopoly level, an increase in the price of the ink above
the competitive level will raise the total price of the service to the
consumer above the optimal monopoly level and will thereby re-
duce the monopolist's profits.
There was a similar confusion in the concept of a "barrier to
entry," a concept that played-and still plays-a large role in think-
ing about competition. Suppose that it costs $10,000,000 to build
the smallest efficient plant to serve some market; then, it was argued,
there is a $10,000,000 "barrier to entry," a hurdle a new entrant
would have to overcome to serve the market at no disadvantage
vis4-vis existing firms.10  But is there really a hurdle? If the
$10,000,000 plant has a useful life of, for example, ten years, the
annual cost to the new entrant is only $1,000,000. Existing firms
bear the same annual cost, assuming that they plan to replace their
lems see C. KA=ysN, United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AN ANTI-TRUST CASE (1956).
See Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws,
72 Hnv. L. 1Ev. 50, 60-62, 63 n.42 (1958).
10 See C. KAYsEN & D. TuENwE, ANTrfrUST Poucr 73 & n.33 (1959).
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plants. The new entrant, therefore, is not at any cost disadvantage
after all.
Advertising presents a similar situation. A new entrant, to get
his product accepted in the market, may have to launch it with an
expensive advertising campaign. Again, this is a capital expendi-
ture, because the effect of the campaign will not be fully used up in
the first year. There is no reason to expect the annual cost of this
capital expenditure to be any higher than that of firms in the
market. They too must spend money on advertising to keep the
consumer interested in their products. Most advertising, in fact,
depreciates more rapidly than most plants; 11 therefore, it is a lesser
"barrier to entry" than having to build a plant (although in the
traditional analysis it was considered a greater one). Neither the
plant nor the advertising is a barrier in any useful sense.
The Chicago school's view of advertising is especially note-
worthy because of the importance that advertising had assumed in
the Harvard thinking on antitrust.12 Advertising played a dual
role in that thinking. First, it was one of the most important bar-
riers to entry. Second, it was used as the riposte to the free-rider
argument about why manufacturers imposed resale price mainte-
nance. The Harvard position was that overcoming the free-rider
problem and thereby increasing the provision of presale services by
the retailer was not a social benefit, because those services were
forms of advertising, and advertising enables the manufacturer more
effectively to differentiate his brand from competitors' brands,
thereby creating or enhancing barriers to entry. The underlying
assumption is that consumers are irrational and manipulable, and
the Chicago theorist rejects this assumption as inconsistent with the
premises of price theory. The rational consumer will pay for ad-
vertising (in the form of a higher price for the advertised brand)
only to the extent that advertising reduces his costs of search. The
"1 The depreciation rate of advertising has been found to be very high in
industries that advertise heavily--such as the cosmetics (13% a year) and cereals
(37%) industries. See Ayanian, Advertising and Rate of Return, 18 J.L. & EcoN.
479, 499 (1975).
'2 Unlike other tenets of the old industrial organization, the hostility to ad-
vertising, though largely abandoned in the new Areeda and Turner treatise, P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTrTRUST LAW (1978); see note 41 infra, continues to
command considerable, though diminished, academic support. See, e.g., W.
ComAor & T. WinsoN, ADVERTSING AD MARKET POWER (1974). For the Chicago
position, see Brozen, Entry Barriers: Advertising and Product Differentiation, in
INDUSTRA.L CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 115 (1974); Telser, Advertising
and Competition, 72 J. Pouca.L EcoN. 537 (1964). For recent discussions see
D. WORcESTER, WELFARE GAiNs FRoM ADVFRTISING: THE PROBLEm OF REcLATION
(1978); Butters, A Survey of Advertising and Market Structure, 66 Am. EcoN.
REv. PAEss & PRoc. 392 (1976).
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services provided by advertising are therefore real services. In
fact, they are indistinguishable from those yielded by a better
product-and it is never suggested that making one's product
genuinely better than those of competitors or potential competitors
creates a "barrier to entry."
A clue to the nature of the Harvard school of industrial organi-
zation is that its practitioners were so fond of doing studies of com-
petition in particular industries-airlines, tin cans, aluminum, rayon,
Douglas firs, etc. These studies exemplified the particularistic and
non-theoretical character of the field. The powerful simplifications
of economic theory-rationality, profit maximization, the downward-
sloping demand curve-were discarded, or at least downplayed, in
favor of microscopic examination of the idiosyncrasies of particular
markets.
The "kinked demand curve," "workable competition," "cut-
throat competition," "leverage," "administered prices," and the
other characteristic concepts of the industrial organization of this
period had this in common: they were not derived from and were
often inconsistent with economic theory, and in particular with the
premises of rational profit maximization. They were derived from
observation, unsystematic and often superficial, of business behavior.
Director's approach was the opposite. He explained tie-ins, resale
price maintenance, and other business behavior described in anti-
trust cases not by studying the practices but by looking for an ex-
planation for them that squared with basic economic theory.13
When they first began to emerge in the articles written by his
colleagues, students, and disciples, Director's ideas made little im-
pact either on scholarly opinion or on policy. In some quarters
the Chicago school was regarded as little better than a lunatic
fringe. Kaysen and Turner's Antitrust Policy, the classic statement
of the Harvard school, published in 1959, contains virtually no
trace of any influence of the Chicago school.14
Twenty years later, the position is dramatically changed.
Partly as a result of George Stigler's attacks on the intellectual
foundations of traditional industrial organization 15 and partly as a
13 It is a curiosity, and a source of regret, that to this day very few of Director's
ideas have been subjected to systematic empirical examination.
14 They do offer a brief discussion of the price discrimination theory of tie-ins.
See C. KAxsN & D. TuRNEr, supra note 10, at 157. Elsewhere, however, the authors
seem to be espousing the leverage theory. Id. 154, 157. But the discussion is
unclear, as is Turner's brief reference to the price discrimination theory in his early
article on tie-ins. See Turner, supra note 9, at 63 n.42.
15 See G. SnGLm, THE ORGANn iATIoN oF INDusTRY (1968) [hereinafter cited
as ORGANIZATioN OF INDusTRY], collecting his major articles on industrial organiza-
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result of the growing sophistication of economic analysis, the tradi-
tional industrial organization is becoming discredited in academic
circles. The Chicago school has largely prevailed with respect to
its basic point: that the proper lens for viewing antitrust problems
is price theory. At the same time, some of the specific ideas first
advanced by Aaron Director have been questioned, modified, and
refined, resulting in the emergence of a new animal: the "diehard
Chicagoan" (such as Bork and Bowman) who has not accepted any
of the suggested refinements of or modifications in Director's
original ideas.
The work of Director and his followers focused on the question
when, if ever, a firm can unilaterally obtain or maintain monopoly
power. The question when a firm can obtain such power by col-
laboration with its competitors received less attention. Partly, per-
haps, for tactical reasons (not to seem to reject antitrust policy in
its entirety), the members of the Chicago school would sometimes
denounce price fixing. But it is unlikely that they regarded even
price fixing, let alone oligopoly, as a serious problem. In the clas-
sical economic tradition running from Smith to Marshall, the tra-
dition in which the Chicago school operates, a clear recognition of
the propensity of sellers to attempt collusion was conjoined with a
general indifference to, and sometimes an explicit rejection of, the
desirability of imposing legal sanctions on collusion. This com-
placency (if one can call it that) rested on the belief that cartels
were, first, highly unstable because of the propensity of members to
cheat (so long as the cartel was not legally enforceable), and, second,
in the long run futile in the absence of substantial barriers to entry.
Collusion might still be attempted frequently if attempting it was
cheap, but it would rarely succeed and its overall misallocative
effects would be too slight to warrant inevitably costly public pro-
ceedings.
Given this tradition, given the Chicago school's rejection of the
expansive notion of "barriers to entry," given the lack of any clear
theoretical basis for oligopoly theory (and its accouterments such
as the kinked demand curve), given Harberger's tiny estimate of the
welfare costs of monopoly, 6 given the atheoretical, ad hoc, and
unsupported character of the efforts to avoid the implications of
Harberger's analysis by ascribing to oligopolists failures of innova-
tion or cost control, it was not to be expected that the Chicago
tion. See also G. STIcrga & J. Kn,wmim, TnE BawaoR on INusTIAT ICES
(1970).
16 See Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 Am. ECON. BE.
PAPERS & Ihoc. 77 (1954).
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school would attach great importance to vigorous prosecution of
colluders. But such enforcement activity, in contrast to that di-
rected against unilateral monopolizing acts, was not deplored.
George Stigler's work in the late 1950's and early 1960's, how-
ever, did focus on collusion and thus served to complete the edifice
of Chicago antitrust thought. A series of articles17 chipped away
at the apparatus that the traditional industrial organization had
constructed to analyze collusion. In its place Stigler proposed a
general theory of collusion that embraced oligopoly, i.e., collusion
not involving explicit communication, as a special case.' He ap-
proached the question of collusion by asking, in the manner of a
price theorist rather than an industrial-organization man, when the
benefits of collusion, in higher profits, exceed the costs (of prevent-
ing cheating) to the individual seller. The rate of entry, the elas-
ticity of demand, the concentration of buyers, and other factors
were identified. Many of these factors had been noted by the
oligopoly theorists; Stigler's contribution was to show that every
facet of the collusion question, including tacit collusion or oligo-
poly behavior, could be analyzed using the tools of price theory.
Stigler's analysis did not deny the possibility of collusion, even
of the tacit variety. But it did suggest that tacit collusion would
be a problem only at very high levels of concentration, 9 and in so
doing cast grave doubt on the necessity for draconian measures,
whether under section 7 of the Clayton Act or section 2 of the
Sherman Act, for preventing tacit collusion by arresting or destroy-
ing concentration.20
By 1969, then, an orthodox Chicago position (well represented
in the writings of Robert Bork) had crystallized: only explicit price
fixing and very large horizontal mergers (mergers to monopoly)
were worthy of serious concern.
II. THx GROWING CONVERGENCE OF =n Two SCHOOLS
The basic tenet of the Chicago school, that problems of compe-
tition and monopoly should be analyzed using the tools of general
17See articles collected in ORGANmZAT N oF INDuSTRy, supra note 15.
18 G. STIGLm, A Theory of Oligopoly, in ORGAmizATioN OF INDUSTRY, supra
note 15, at 39.
19 Id. 57, 59. See also Kessel, A Study of the Effect of Competition in the
Tax-Exempt Bond Market, 79 J. PoLIIcAL EcoN. 706, 727 (1971).
2 0 See PimswmT'S TAsK FORCE REPORT ON PRODUCTIVITY AmD COMPETITION
(1969), reprinted in I Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings on
H. Res. 66 Before the Special Subcomm. on Small Business and the Robinson-
Patman Act of the House Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
271 (1969).
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economic theory rather than those of traditional industrial organi-
zation, has triumphed. The concepts and methods of traditional
industrial organization are increasingly discredited in economics
as practiced in the leading universities and this change is beginning
to be reflected in the application of economics to antitrust law. The
new Areeda and Turner treatise 2' is a notable example of this point,
although the treatise, perhaps because it is addressed primarily to
practitioners rather than scholars, does not explicitly acknowledge
the modification or abandonment of many of Professor Turner's
earlier views. At the same time, the application of price theory to
antitrust law has not left the pioneering work of Director and his
followers untouched.
Let us consider now how the passage of years has affected some
of the specific controversies between the Chicago and Harvard
schools.
1. Tie-ins. The leverage theory of tie-ins early gave way in
Harvard thinking to a barriers-to-entry theory.22 A tie-in was said
to complicate entry because the new entrant would have to pro-
duce the tied as well as the tying product. When the motive for
tying is price discrimination, however, the producer of the tying
product need not assume control over any part of the production of
the tied product, let alone produce it all. Instead, all that is re-
quired is that he act as an intermediary between the producer and
the ultimate consumer so that he can reprice it in accordance with
his discriminatory scheme. 23 A new entrant will be able to obtain
the tied product from the same source that the existing firm obtains
it from.
One element (and an important one) of the Chicago analy-
sis is, however, subject to criticism: the assumption that price dis-
crimination is on the whole socially beneficial because it moves the
monopolist's output closer to the competitive level and hence re-
duces the misallocative effects of monopoly. As Joan Robinson
pointed out long ago, if price discrimination is not perfect (and it
21 P. A=iEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12. Another important example, less
dramatic only because the author is too young to have had earlier published views
to recant, is Ernest Gellhorn's Antitrust Law and Economics. E. GELLHOim, ANTI-
TRUST LAw AND EcoNoMIcs 257-60, 283-85 (1976).
22 The barrier-to-entry theory of tie-ins appears in Kaysen and Turner's treatise.
C. KAYsEN & D. TURNER, supra note 10, at 157. As pointed out above, it is not
clear whether Kaysen and Turner also espoused the leverage theory. See note 14
supra.
2 3 
It is hardly credible, for example, that the A.B. Dick Company was trying to
take over the production of ink in the United States. See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.,
224 U.S. 1, 11 (1911).
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never is), it may lead to a smaller, rather than a larger, output
than single-price monopoly. 4 For example, many of the heavy
users of mimeograph machines might be deterred by an ink tie-in
that had the effect of raising the price of the machine and the loss
of output might not be offset by greater business from small users,
even though on balance the monopolist's profits were higher (higher
profits, rather than greater output, being the purpose of price dis-
crimination). Even a larger output may not result in a smaller
misallocation. The price-discriminating monopolist breaks up his
demand curve into a series of separate demand curves for different
groups of customers. Within each of these submarkets he sells the
output that equates his marginal revenue to his marginal cost. The
total misallocation brought about by the price-discriminating mo-
nopolist is the sum of the misallocations in each submarket, and
may easily exceed the misallocation caused by a monopolist charging
a single price and producing a smaller output.2 5
Other criticisms of the Chicago position have also been made.
Professor Williamson, for instance, has noted that price discrimina-
tion involves extra transaction costs-specifically, the costs of prevent-
ing the low-price purchasers from reselling to the high-price pur-
chasers (arbitrage)-which reduce the welfare gains from a higher
output-if output is in fact higher.26 It has also been argued that,
by increasing the expected gains from monopolizing, price discrimi-
nation increases the investment in monopolizing-which may not
be socially desirable. Indeed, the costs of creating and maintaining
monopolies may exceed the misallocative costs resulting from the
smaller output of monopolized compared to competitive markets.
27
In the light of such criticism, the original Chicago analysis of
the effects of tie-ins now seems a little oversimple. Nevertheless,
24J. RoBiNsoN, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITON 190-94 (1933).
See also P. SAMUEoLSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 42-45 (1947). Bork
thinks it likely that price discrimination, even if imperfect, will generally result in a
larger output than a single-price monopoly. R. Boax, supra note 2, at 397. He
relies for this conclusion primarily on Joan Robinson's analysis, but I cannot find
anything in her analysis that supports any general conclusion regarding the output
effects of discriminatory versus nondiscriminatory monopoly.
251 am indebted to Dennis Carlton for having pointed this out to me.
260. WLLAmSON, MARKETs Am HIEmARcHs: ANALYsis ANo ANT=RST
hPLICATIONS 11-13 (1975).
27 See Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. Car. L.
REv. 506, 510-13 (1974). Bork criticizes the argument on the ground that some
monopolies are a byproduct of socially desirable activity, e.g., innovation, and in
those cases the effect of price discrimination in making monopoly more profitable,
and hence inducing greater resources to be expended on obtaining it, need not
occasion concern. R. Boar,, supra note 2, at 396. The point is correct. See
Posner, supra, at 513-14. But it is different from the point that price discrimination
is socially desirable because it leads to a larger output of the monopolized product.
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the conclusion that tie-ins should not be forbidden seems both cor-
rect 28 and increasingly influential on academic opinion.
2. Vertical integration. Here too the leverage theory was even-
tually replaced by a barriers-to-entry theory (the economic analysis of
vertical integration being, as I have indicated, symmetrical with that
of tie-ins).2 9 The thinking was that if, for example, supplier A
acquires all of his retail outlets, B, in order to compete, will have
to open his own chain of outlets. This, in turn, will make B's entry
more costly. The steps in this analysis are illogical, however, and
evidence of monopolization by such means scant or nonexistent.30
A will find it very costly to buy more outlets than he needs. B,
on the other hand, will not have to open his own outlets to enter;
if his entry is anticipated, the outlets will be there to greet him.
Moreover, even if B did have to open his own retail outlets, the
higher capital cost of his entry would still be no greater than the
(also higher) capital cost to A of being a retailer as well as a manu-
facturer. The analysis does not depend on whether retail outlets
are cheap or expensive to build or acquire or on whether the in-
tegration in question is forward into distribution or backward into
raw-material, or other, supply. The essential point is that the cost
to the monopolist of integrating is prima facie the same as the cost
to the new entrant of having to integrate. 31 The validity of this
analysis is not affected even if the result of integration is completely
to deny the new entrant access to some essential input except by
dealing with the existing firms in the market. The cost to the
existing firms is still the same as to the new entrant, although now
it is in the form of an opportunity cost. Suppose, for example, that
kryptonite is an indispensable input in the manufacture of widgets.
A owns all the kryptonite in the universe and also manufactures
widgets. He could, of course, refuse to sell kryptonite to B, a pros-
pective entrant into widget production. The cost to A of this
refusal is the price B would have been willing to pay. Stated dif-
ferently, by his control of kryptonite A can extract any monopoly
28 See R. PosNER, supra note 2, at 178-83.
29 See C. KAYs-N & D. Tum, supra note 10, at 120-21. Kaysen and Turner
also espoused a leverage theory of vertical integration. Id. 121-22.
3 0 See Peltzman, Issues in Vertical Integration Policy, in PuBuc Poricy TowARD
MERGERS 167 (1969).
31 This assumes equal access to capital markets and equal cost of obtaining
capital. These assumptions have been criticized by Professor Williamson, Williamson,
Book Review, 83 YALE L.J. 647, 656-57 (1974), among others. In only one respect,
however, and that a minor one, can this position be sustained, at least in the absence
of evidence that has so far not been forthcoming. See text accompanying note
61 infra.
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rents available in the widget industry without denying a place in
widget manufacture to others firms. If there is a proper antitrust
objection, it is to the kryptonite monopoly rather than to vertical
integration.
Yet, despite the force of these arguments, it is incorrect to dis-
miss entirely the possibility of monopolistic consequences from ver-
tical arrangements. The above arguments assume that, as in the
case of the manufacturer-retailer, the relevant inputs, e.g., the manu-
factured product and its distribution, are combined in fixed propor-
tions to produce the final output (the sale at retail). Suppose, how-
ever, that some input is used in variable proportions with other
inputs to produce the final output, e.g., uranium and enrichment
services in the production of nuclear fuel. If one of the inputs is
monopolized, causing its price to rise in relation to those of other
inputs, the output manufacturer will seek to reduce the proportion
in which he uses this input and, instead, use more of the other
inputs. The possibility of such substitution acts as a partial check
on the monopoly power of the input monopolist. Assume, how-
ever, that the input producer buys the input user. This will elimi-
nate the threat of substitution and so reduce the elasticity of de-
mand for the input in question.32  Even so, it does not follow that
the merger should be prohibited, for one of its effects is that the in-
puts will now be used in the proportions that minimize the true
social costs of manufacturing the output. But it cannot be said that
such a merger, merely because it is vertical, cannot possibly increase
monopoly. So saying, I do not mean to suggest that such an equivo-
cal and perhaps remote 33 danger warrants reversing the growing
support, at least in academic circles, for a permissive policy toward
vertical mergers and vertical integration generally.
The change in thinking that has been brought about by the
Chicago school is nowhere more evident than in the area of vertical
integration. Kaysen and Turner, writing in 1959, advocated for-
bidding any vertical merger in which the acquiring firm had twenty
32 See Vernon & Graham, Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Integration,
79 J. PoLITe AL EcoN. 924 (1971), discussed in McGee & Bassett, Vertical Integra-
tion Revisited, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 17 (1976). See also Blair & Kaserman, Vertical
Integration, Tying, and Antitrust Policy, 68 Am. EcoN. Rav. 397 (1978), and
references cited therein. Blair and Kaserman note that the same result can be
obtained by the input monopolist's tying potentially substitutable inputs to the sale
of the input he controls. They offer no example showing that this has ever been
done.
S3 A very recent paper suggests, on theoretical grounds, that monopoly power is
unlikely to be increased substantially. See Mallela & Nahata, Theory of Vertical
Control With Variable Proportions (forthcoming in Journal of Political Economy).
A similar conclusion is reached by Bork. See R. Bona, supra note 2, at 229-31.
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percent or more of its market.3 4  Areeda and Turner, writing in
1978, express very little concern with anticompetitive effects from
vertical integration. In fact, as between a rule of per se illegality
for vertical integration by monopolists and a rule of per se legality,
their preference is for the latter.3 5
3. Restricted distribution. As noted above, the Harvard reply
to the Chicago analysis of resale price maintenance was that the
benefit that the manufacturer sought to obtain by restricting com-
petition among his distributors, i.e., presale services, was actually a
social evil, because these services resulted in "product differentia-
tion," a barrier to entry.38 Facing no close substitutes for his brand
because it was differentiated in the consumer's eyes from competing
brands,37 the producer could charge a monopoly price. If the case
of fraudulent advertising is put to one side, the conclusion that
advertising and related promotional methods create monopoly
power, at least in any sense relevant to antitrust policy, cannot be
derived from the premises of economic theory. Consumers will not
pay more for one brand than for another unless the first is cheaper
or better.33 Advertising can make an advertised brand cheaper by
reducing the consumer's search costs by an amount greater than
the difference in nominal price between that brand and nonad-
vertised brands of the same product. The same point can be made
with respect to the other presale services, e.g., display, that are
encouraged by restricted distribution.
The new industrial organization, which relates advertising to
the costs of search, has transformed advertising from a social evil
into a social benefit,3 9 and in so doing has fatally undermined the
Comanor riposte to the Director-Telser theory of resale price main-
tence. Although inter-school differences relating to the welfare
effects of advertising remain,40 the position of the Chicago school
34 C. KAYsEN & D. Tum -Rs_, supra note 10, at 133.
5 3 P. AREmDA & D. TuRmiu, supra note 12, ff 726b. Areeda and Turner are
discussing vertical integration by internal expansion rather than by merger, but their
analysis implies a tolerant attitude toward either form.
36 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
87 See Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor
and Its Aftermath, 81 Hnv. L. REv. 1419, 1425-33 (1968).
88 This assumes, of course, that the consumer is rational. That is one of the
standard assumptions of economic theory. It is not equivalent to assuming that the
consumer is omniscient. Indeed, the existence of consumer search costs is an
important reason why there is advertising. See Nelson, Advertising as Information,
82 J. PozrrcA EcoN. 729 (1974).
39 See references in D. WoRcEsTER, supra note 12, at 209.
40 This is indicated by Professor Richard Nelson's comments on this paper which
follow.
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on restricted distribution has become the orthodox academic posi-
tion.4 ' The decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc.42 suggests that it is well on its way to becoming the legal posi-
tion as well.
4. Predatory pricing. McGee's famous article on the Standard
Oil Trust 43 combined the startling empirical finding that the trust,
contrary to popular and academic belief, had not engaged in pre-
datory pricing, with theoretical arguments for doubting the ra-
tionality of the practice. One of McGee's major arguments-that the
trust would not have used predatory pricing because it is cheaper
to buy a competitor than to sell below cost-was vulnerable to the
criticism of being irrelevant to present-day circumstances, since
acquiring a major competitor is clearly and unconcealably unlawful
whereas predatory pricing may be difficult to detect. There is, how-
ever, a deeper problem with the McGee argument: it neglects
strategic considerations. Assume that it is lawful to buy a rival.
It does not follow that a firm will never resort to predatory pricing.
After all, it wants to minimize the price at which it buys its rivals,
and that price will be lower if it can convince them of its willingness
to drive them out of business unless they sell out on its terms. One
way to convince them of this is to engage in predatory pricing from
time to time.
Since classical (or, one might add, modern) economics contains
no generally accepted theory of strategic behavior, it is not surpris-
ing that the Chicago school should not have been particularly
concerned with predatory pricing. Eliminate strategic considera-
tions, and it becomes impossible to construct a rational motivation
for predatory pricing without assuming (very uncongenially to a
Chicagoan) asymmetric access to the capital markets for financing
a period of below-cost selling. But to ignore strategic considera-
tions is not satisfactory. Even without having a well-developed
theory of strategic behavior, one can easily imagine circumstances
in which predatory pricing, at least in the absence of legal prohibi-
tion, would be a plausible policy for a profit-maximizing seller to
41 The new Areeda and Turner treatise essentially adopts the Chicago position
on advertising, in the course of discounting the significance of advertising as a barrier
to entry. See 2 P. APRA & D. TumNER, supra note 12, ff 409d. For Turner's
earlier contrary views see Turner, Advertising and Competition, 26 Fm. B.J. 93
(1966).
42 433 U.S. 36 (1977), discussed in Posner, The Rule of Reason and the
Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 1
(1977).
4 3 McGee, supra note 2.
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follow. Suppose that he sells in many markets, and his rivals sell
in only one or a few markets each. If he sells below cost in one
market, his losses there are an investment that will be recouped
with interest in his other markets in the form of more timid competi-
tion from the rivals in those markets. Knowing that the multi-
market seller can obtain substantial gains from a demonstrated
willingness to sell below cost for an extended period of time in
one market, the local victim may not think it worthwhile to try to
outlast him.
To be sure, the administrative and error costs of trying to
prevent this sort of thing may outweigh its dangers to the competi-
tive process. That, however, is a different point. My point is
that predatory pricing is not irrational. It is not in the same cate-
gory with, for example, attempting to get a second monopoly
through tying. Bork is able to place predatory pricing in the irra-
tional category only by failing to mention the possibility of strategic
behavior.4
Additional evidence for the decline of "schools" of antitrust
economics is the position that Areeda and Turner (both of the
Harvard Law School) have taken on predatory pricing. Their in-
fluential article on the subject (and the amplification of the arti-
cle in their new treatise) is an essay in price theory.45 Strategic
considerations, the sort of thing the traditional industrial organiza-
tion embraced eagerly, e.g., in oligopoly theory, are not mentioned,
and skepticism of the likelihood of predatory pricing is registered.
46
Using the basic premises of classical price theory, Areeda and Turner
argue that the only price that should be condemned as predatory is
one below short-run marginal cost. Any higher price implies an
opportunity to utilize scarce resources more fully by lowering price
and expanding output. This is pure textbook price theory un-
adorned by any of the concepts of traditional industrial organization.
It is not surprising that Professor Scherer, a leading adherent
of traditional industrial organization thinking, launched a sweeping
attack on the Areeda-Turner article,47 or that Professor Williamson
44 R. Boarx, supra note 2, at 144-55.
45 Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, 88 Hiiiv. L. REv. 697 (1975); 3 P. ArEEDA & D. Ttnuaa,
supra note 12, 1[ 711.
46 A curiosity of the Areeda and Turner treatment is that no theory of why
predatory pricing would ever occur is suggested.
4 7 Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HAnv. L.
Pzv. 869 (1976); see Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89
HAnv. L. REv. 891 (1976); Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89
HAnv. L. REv. 901 (1976).
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criticized Areeda and Turner for ignoring strategic considerations
in designing a rule against predatory pricing.48 What is, perhaps,
surprising is that I attacked Areeda and Turner as unduly per-
missive.4 9 Unfortunately, my attack bogged down in a terminolog-
ical dispute. I said that the proper criterion of predatory pricing
was selling below long-run rather than short-run marginal cost with
intent to destroy an equally or more efficient rival and that short-
run marginal cost is lower than long-run marginal cost even when
the firm is operating at its full (optimal) capacity, because some of
elements of long-run marginal cost are fixed in the short run.
Areeda and Turner pounced on the assertion that short-run mar-
ginal cost is below long-run marginal cost at full capacity. They
pointed out that it would be costlier for a firm already operating at
full capacity to expand in the short run than in the long run, for
only in the long run could the firm make the adjustments in plant
scale, etc., necessary to optimize production at a higher levelY0 I
accept this criticism. Although I continue to be troubled by cases,
potentially significant in the predatory-pricing context, in which
long-run marginal cost might be thought to exceed short-run mar-
ginal cost even without excess capacity,51 these cases can be dealt
with by careful definition of the relevant terms.
4 8 See Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87
YALE L.J. 284 (1977).
49 See B. PosNm, supra note 2, at 191-93.
5o 3 P. AnzxnA & D. TuwN6 supra note 12, ff 715a, at 168 n.7.
rnTo illustrate very simply the kind of problem that led me to my original
formulation, imagine a firm that at its current level of production makes 100 units
at a total cost of $1,000.00, this cost consisting of (1) a rental of $500.00 for the
factory premises and (2) labor and materials (short-run variable) costs of $5.00 per
unit. The firm decides to cut price and expand output for the sole purpose of
driving a more efficient rival out of the market. The firm's new production level is
101 units. At this level of production, which is greater than optimal, the labor and
materials cost of the last unit is, say, $5.50; but rent, a fixed debit, is unchanged.
The firm's short-run marginal cost is then $5.50. What is its long-run marginal
cost? We must ask what the landlord would charge when the lease comes up for
renewal if the output of the firm has risen. Presumably, the rental will be higher-
suppose it is $5.00 higher. (The figure is not particularly important, so long as it
is large enough to make the long-run marginal cost curve of the firm higher than
at the current level; if it is lower, the present output of the firm cannot be optimal.)
Assume further that in the long run the labor and materials cost of expanding output
by one unit would be $5.10. Then the long-run marginal cost, that is, the cost in
the long rin of expanding output from 100 to 101 units, is $10.10. But the short-run
marginal cost is only $5.50 despite the fact that the expansion is from the level of
production that is optimal given the firm's existing plant, work force, etc.
As another example, suppose there are some workers who divide their time
between production and maintenance. To expand output, the firm shifts these
workers entirely into production. In the short run, the increased labor cost of pro-
duction may be completely offset by the reduction in maintenance expense; in the
long ran, the maintenance expense is, if anything, higher.
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But this is a side issue that only obscures the serious problems
of the short-run marginal cost standard. The lesser problem is
that the standard gives the would-be predator an incentive to main-
tain excess capacity and thereby reduce his short-run marginal costs,
an incentive the predator might have anyway in order to make his
threat to sell below cost more credible.5 2 The greater problem is
that the administrative difficulties of basing the legal rule on the
concept of short-run marginal cost are so acute as to have led
Areeda and Turner themselves to reject short-run marginal cost as
the operational standard and instead substitute average variable cost.
Yet they continue to defend that standard by reference to the argu-
ments, such as they are, for allowing firms to cut price to short-run
marginal cost. Average variable cost could be much below short-
run marginal cost.53 A standard of average variable cost should be
defended on its own merits, rather than by reference to a different
standard for which it is the crudest possible proxy. But Areeda
and Turner do not attempt to defend an average variable cost stand-
ard, save as a proxy for short-run marginal cost.
What is the point of having such a low price floor? It would
be unusual for a firm that wanted to engage in predatory pricing to
set a price equal to or only slightly above zero. It would set a price
designed to make its competitors' business unprofitable at minimum
cost to itself. Any firm that sells at a price equal to its average
variable costs, a price that doesn't cover any of its fixed costs (let
alone generate any return on investment), will be unprofitable.
Therefore, even if the competitor is somewhat more efficient than
the predator, a price equal to the predator's variable costs, and
hence close to the competitor's variable costs, should be an effec-
tive predatory price. Areeda and Turner allude to this possibility
in a cryptic footnote. They write:
One can posit a case in which (1) one rival has lower
variable costs but higher total costs than the other, (2) their
The second example suggests the way to reconcile my analysis with the
conventional textbook formulation. We can say that the added future maintenance
cost resulting from the shift of workers from maintenance to production is actually
one of the short-run marginal costs of stepping up production and that the higher
rental that will be negotiated for the future period is actually a short-run marginal
cost of the present increase in production.
52 See Spence, Entry, Capacity, and Oligopolistic Pricing, 8 BELL J. EcoN.
534 (1977).
53 In my example, see note 51 supra, Areeda and Turner would, I take it, regard
short-run marginal cost as somewhere above $10.10 (since that is the long-run
marginal cost at the higher level of output). But the average variable cost is only
a shade over $5.00.
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joint capacity exceeds the demand at a price that would be
profitable to both, and hence (3) marginal-cost pricing by
the first rival would drive out the second, which is the
more efficient producer in the long run when capital
facilities have to be replaced. But even in such a case, the
appropriate short-run solution is production by the rival
with the lowest variable costs. Obviously, one would not
want that firm to replace its facilities, but a rational firm
would not do so if the cheaper technique were available
to it, or if others could freely enter using that technique.5
4
The last sentence in effect denies the possibility of predatory pric-
ing by asserting that a rational firm would not replace its facilities
if the cheaper technique were available to it or if others could
"freely enter" with that technique. The first alternative, the avail-
ability of the cheaper technique, simply retracts the premise of the
discussion-that there is a competitor who is "the more efficient
producer in the long run when capital facilities have to be re-
placed." If a predator is always as efficient in the long run as his
competitors, there is little reason to forbid predatory pricing. A
more efficient competitor can exclude a less efficient one without
pricing below cost and thereby losing money in the short run. To
have a rational basis, a rule against predation must assume that
firms sometimes want to cling to their markets although they are
less efficient than their rivals, i.e., the "cheaper technique" is not
available to them.
The second alternative suggested is free entry by firms as effi-
cient as the excluded competitor. There are two ways in which to
interpret the meaning of free entry here. One is that there is no
need to worry about predatory pricing if there are many potential
entrants waiting in the wings: the predator cannot possibly deter
them all. If so, there is little reason to have any rule against preda-
tory pricing. Alternatively, Areeda and Turner may be suggesting
that predatory pricing is possible only where there are barriers to
entry. This, however, neglects strategic considerations, which do
not depend on the existence of barriers to entry.55
The quoted passage fails to take the problem of predatory
pricing seriously. It implies that no rational firm would engage in
predatory pricing if its long-run marginal costs were higher than
those of its victims. If this is so (which I question on the basis of
64 3 P. Ax=nA & D. Tuam, supra note 12, ff 715a, at 168 n.7.
65 See 0. W=AmsoN, MAraKTS ANo MEA-cimm s: ANALYSIS AND ANTTRusT
IMpLCAONS 145-48 (1975).
19791
944 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the strategic considerations suggested earlier), why is it necessary to
forbid predatory pricing? Predatory pricing against less efficient
firms is not a serious danger since they can be excluded by pricing
at or above cost. Areeda and Turner may think that business irra-
tionality is sufficiently common to warrant a rule against predatory
pricing.5 16 In any event, if there is sufficient danger of predatory
pricing to warrant having a legal rule, as Areeda and Turner for
whatever reason believe, that danger is triggered when a firm that
is less efficient than its rivals cuts its price to its variable costs in
order to make it unprofitable for those rivals to enter or remain in
the market. Indeed, to repeat an earlier point, it is hard to see
why a predator would ever have to price below that level in order
to discourage rivals.
Whoever is correct in the debate over predatory pricing, one
thing is clear: the debate is no longer one between schools that
employ consistently different and ideologically tinged premises to
reach predictably opposite results.
III. REMAINING DIFFERENCES
There is one very important area in which traces of the tradi-
tional differences between Chicago price theorists and Harvard in-
dustrial organizationists persist: the two schools continue to disagree
over the significance of concentration and the wisdom of a policy
of deconcentration. Williamson and many other lawyers and econ-
omists continue to believe that persistently high concentration in
an industry warrants breaking up the leading firms. Brozen, Dem-
setz, Stigler, Baxter, and others disagree (the last two named, it
should be noted, are defectors from the ranks of the deconcentra-
tors) 7 Areeda and Turner, as will be seen, appear to take an
intermediate position.
The heart of the difference is not over the strength of the posi-
tive correlation, found in many studies, between concentration and
profitability but over the explanation for it. The Harvard school,
still identifiable as such on this issue, contends that the correlation is
explained by the fact that the leading firms in highly concentrated
industries employ "conscious parallelism" to avoid price competi-
tion and thereby earn abnormal profits. The Chicago school does
56 It is difficult to determine their precise position because they do not explain
under what circumstances they would expect predatory pricing to occur.
57 Industrial Concentration: The New Learning contains a very fall version
of this debate. INDusTRiAL CONcENTRATION: TE NEw LEAENNG (H. Goldschmid,
H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974).
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not deny that concentration is a factor that facilitates collusion of
a sort difficult to detect, although it attaches less significance to
concentration per se than do the oligopoly theorists.' It asks,
rather, how it is that excessive profitability can persist without
attracting new entry that will cause prices to fall to the competitive
level. The Harvard school, after all, wants to restructure only the
persistently concentrated industries. If the leading firms in such
industries are able, by virtue of concentration, to obtain supra-
competitive profits, these profits should act as a magnet to other
firms in the economy and their entry will deconcentrate the indus-
try. That is what happened to the steel industry in the years fol-
lowing the formation of U.S. Steel Corporation in 1901.0 Persistent
concentration implies either that the market in question simply
does not have room for many firms (economies of scale) or that some
firms are able persistently to obtain abnormal profits by cost reduc-
tions or product improvements that competitors and new entrants
are unable to duplicate.5 9 Neither case is an attractive one for
public intervention designed to change the market structure.
The Harvard reply is that there is an alternative explanation
for persistent concentration in particular industries: barriers to
entry. Because Stigler's definition of a barrier to entry, as a cost
that differentially affects new entrants compared to firms already in
the market 0° is now generally accepted, the search is for costs hav-
ing this characteristic. The most sophisticated quester, Oliver
Williamson, has found one: the uncertainty of the new entrant's
prospects may force him to pay a higher risk premium to obtain
capital than existing firms must pay.61 This is a legitimate point.
But it is difficult to believe that such a difference in the cost of
capital would be enough to prevent entry if the firms in a market
were charging prices substantially above their costs. The risk
premium is unlikely to be a large fraction of the new entrant's
costs. Interest and profit are rarely more than ten percent of a man-
ufacturing firm's sales price and often they are a much smaller per-
centage. Thus, even if a new entrant had to pay a ten percent
higher interest rate and (expected) return to shareholders to attract
the necessary capital, its total costs would be only about one percent
higher than those of the firms already in the market. There is no
doubt that the differential risk premium is smaller if the new en-
58 See OncA&NInoN Or .NnUSTRY, supra note 15, at 108.
59 See, e.g., Peltzman, The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration, 20
J.L. & ECON. 229 (1977).
6o see OncAzno'TON or IkusTny, supra note 15, at 67-70.
61 See Williamson, supra note 31, at 656-59.
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trant is a well-established firm in other markets, as will typically
be the case, and, to the extent that the risk is diversifiable, the risk
premium will be still smaller or even disappear entirely. Another
important source of new entry, viewing the term functionally rather
than lexicographically, is the expansion of the existing small firms in
the market. In response to supracompetitive pricing, a fringe of
small firms in a market may be able to expand output moderately
without incurring significantly higher capital costs than those borne
by the larger firms in the market. All in all, it seems far-fetched to
base a policy of deconcentration on the allegedly higher borrowing
costs of new entrants in concentrated markets.
Williamson has also argued that if a firm once grows big, for
whatever reason, there is no reason to expect it to decline as a result
of the random shocks to which it and other market participants
will be subjected over time.62 But he neglects a crucial factor. The
firm is by hypothesis charging a supracompetitive price as a result
of the interdependence or collusion fostered by the concentrated
market structure in which it finds itself. That price will attract
new firms (or, what amounts to the same thing, expansion by the
smaller firms in the market) and the oligopolist will either have to
cut price or surrender market share. In the former case, profits will
fall and in the latter, concentration will decrease. The persistence
of high concentration together with excess profitability remains to
be accounted for.
Deconcentration policy, then, is critically dependent upon be-
lief in the existence of substantial barriers to entry in many indus-
tries. Once "barrier to entry" was redefined as a differentially
higher cost borne by the new entrant, the plausibility of supposing
that barriers to entry are common, or commonly substantial, dimin-
ished sharply. The deconcentrators are thus arguing from an
abandoned premise. This can be seen most dearly by comparing
the discussion of barriers to entry in Kaysen and Turner's Antitrust
Policy and in Areeda and Turner's Antitrust Law. Both books are
concerned over the anti-competitive consequences of deconcentra-
tion, although the latter much more qualifiedly so, and only at much
higher levels of concentration. 63 The view of barriers to entry,
however, is very different in the two books.4 To Kaysen and
62 See Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure
Considerations, 85 HAny. L. REv. 1512, 1518-19 (1972).
63 Compare C. KAYsE & D. Timws, supra note 10, at 27, 72, 104 n.6 with
2 P. AmeDA & D. TuRNsR, supra note 12, IIf 406b, 407d & 408c.
6 4 Compare C. KAYsEN & D. Turamm, supra note 10, at 73-74 with 2 P. AREEDA
& D. TuRNun, supra note 12, If 409.
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Turner they are numerous and include economies of scale, capital
requirements, scarce know-how and inputs, and product differentia-
tion. No rigorous definition of barrier to entry is offered; nor do
the authors deduce the concept of barriers to entry from the as-
sumption that business firms act as rational profit maximizers. The
important point, however, is that, believing barriers to entry to be
numerous and prevalent, the authors have a rational basis for want-
ing to deconcentrate concentrated markets. Areeda and Turner
greatly pare down the list of barriers to entry. Because they utilize
Stigler's definition of a barrier to entry, they are led to exclude
economies of scale entirely. The related size-of-capital barrier is
discarded also and product differentiation is discounted on the
basis of a view of advertising that is close to the Chicago view. The
only barriers that remain are: (1) the Williamson risk-premium ver-
sion of the capital barrier and (2) control of scarce input.65 Thus,
Areeda and Turner largely discard the concept of barrier to entry,
finding some of the barriers theoretically invalid and others em-
pirically unimportant; such "pure" barriers as remain surely cannot
explain much concentration. And although Areeda and Turner
do not expressly discuss the dependence of deconcentration theory
on the belief in the existence of high and pervasive barriers to
entry, they do draw quite different policy implications concerning
persistent high concentration from Kaysen and Turner. Whereas
the earlier book recommended a policy of deconcentration, the later
book recommends remedial action, whether under existing antitrust
provisions or new legislation, only where there is proof of non-
competitive performance.66  There is more than a nuance of dif-
ference between these two views. Here, then, is further evidence
that even in the most important area where distinctive "Harvard"
6 5 Legal barriers to entry such as patents are quite properly ignored as beyond
the reach of antitrust policy. As a detail, I think Areeda and Turner are wrong to
treat control of a scarce input as a barrier to entry into the output market. See 2
P. A.EEDA & D. TumnR, supra note 12, ff 409b. To treat it so is a version of the
leverage fallacy. If a seller of widgets controls an indispensable input into widget
production, call it manganium, he will have little incentive to restrict entry into the
widget market. His control of manganium will enable him to extract all of the
economic rents obtainable in the widget market without selling any widgets, let alone
trying to control the widget market. (To be sure, I am ignoring considerations of
input substitution in the variable-proportions case and of price discrimination, but
these are second-order considerations and are in any event not the basis on which
Areeda and Turner deem control of a key input a barrier to entry.) Alternatively,
if the scarce input is not a good but, say, the services of an extraordinarily skilled
manager, he will presumably extract all (or more realistically most) of the benefits
that his services confer on the firm, in the form of a rent; consequently, the firm's
costs may be little lower than those of other firms in the market, or of prospective
entrants.
66 See, e.g., 3 P. A=A & D. TunNm, supra note 12, i[ 840.
1979]
948 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
and "Chicago" approaches remain discernible, the process of con-
vergence is well under way.67
CONCLUSION
Although this paper has not attempted an exhaustive canvass of
rival theories of antitrust analysis,68 it has, I hope, said enough to
persuade the reader that the oldest and most persistent stereotype
in antitrust economics, that of the Chicago school, bears little rela-
tionship to the current state of academic thinking. Changes of
mind within both the Chicago school and its principal rival, which
I have called the Harvard school, have produced a steady trend
toward convergence. Differences remain, but increasingly they are
technical rather than ideological.69
67 A further aspect of the Chicago-Harvard difference on deconcentration arises
from the difference between the deep distrust of government intervention that is
associated with the Chicago School of Economics (in the broader, Milton Friedman
sense) and the (rapidly diminishing) complacency toward such intervention asso-
ciated with traditional Harvard-M.I.T. economic thinking. Deconcentration is a
more ambitious form of public control than is usually involved in antitrust enforce-
ment, so one's attitudes toward the capabilities of regulatory-type governmental
interventions naturally come into play. That is why adherents of the Chicago school
believe it unsound to base a policy of deconcentration on the assumption that a
deconcentration proceeding is a swifter method than entry itself of deconcentrating
markets in which there are no barriers to entry in the technical sense but in which
entry at minimum cost requires substantial time.
68 1 have not, for instance, discussed the "transactional cost" analysis associated
with Oliver Williamson. That analysis combines elements of Harvard thinking with
elements of the thought of Ronald Coase and elements of the Carnegie-Mellon
school. I have also not mentioned Richard Markovits, who has revived Chamberlains
brand of old-fashioned industrial organization, the populist school associated with
Willard Mueller and others, or the diehard industrial organizationists such as
Michael Mann.
69 Professor Richard Nelson, whose comments on this paper follow, evidently
disagrees. But he is a careful reader neither of my work nor of the recent journal
literature that he purports to summarize. He suggests, for example, that the recent
Chicago writing denies the possibility of adjustment lags or costs in new entry
into a concentrated industry. But a recognition of that possibility is in fact an
important aspect of the work of Stigler, see ORGANIZATION OF INusTRY, supra note
15, at 108, and of me, see, e.g., Posner, supra note 2, at 29; note 66 supra. He
implies that the Chicago school has ignored uncertainty, information, and search
costs: on the contrary, the current interest in these subjects stems from George
Stigler's pioneering article on the economics of information. See G. Stigler, The
Economics of Information, in ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY, supra note 15, at 171.
And the Chicago school's analysis of advertising differs from the traditional Harvard
view precisely in bringing consumer search costs into the analysis. See, e.g., Nelson,
supra note 38. The role of transaction costs in explaining vertical integration, al-
though latterly associated with Oliver Williamson, stems from the early article by
Coase. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcoNolncA 506 (1937).
More important, while Professor Nelson argues that some of the very recent
literature modifies or refines the economic theory underlying the Chicago school's
analysis, nowhere does he state that the literature supports a more active antitrust
policy than the Chicago analysis recommends, or for that matter a different antitrust
policy. His analysis appears to have no policy implications.
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